Dmitry Medvedev - elections - Russia - Vladimir Putin

Passage of power in Russian elections

Monday 03 March 2008

Grigory Yavlinsky, chairman of the opposition Russian Democratic Party Yabloko, talks to FRANCE 24 about Sunday's elections and the implications of Dmitry Medvedev's inevitable succession from outgoing president Vladimir Putin. Read the script.

 

Ulysse Gosset – Welcome to France 24 for this new edition of The Talk de Paris. We will be looking at Russia’s upcoming presidential elections and at the Kremlin, in Moscow, where Vladimir Putin has a plan. He has anointed his candidate and successor, Dmitri Medvedev, who is now bound to become Russia’s next President (with Mr Putin as his Prime Minister). A two-headed eagle may be the symbol of Eternal Russia, but can a two-headed government fly? Or is this election just a cover-up? Our guest live from Moscow today is Grigory Yavlinski, one of the opposition’s leading figures and the President of the Russian United Democratic Party also known as Yabloko (Russian for “apple”). Grigory Yavlinski, a university economics lecturer, ran for President in the 2000 elections, but won’t be running again this year – and will be telling us why. Bonjour Grigory Yavlinski.

 

Grigory Yavlinski – Bonjour. It’s a pleasure to be with you.

 

 

How do you feel about Russian politics today? How do you feel about the coming elections? What are the stakes in Russia – and for Europe?

 

It’s a very special system. In my view – and in the view of many likeminded people – the elections are not an institution as such. They are more akin to a scheme enabling Vladimir Putin to transfer power to his friend and successor Dmitry Medvedev. So it’s not an election in the sense Europeans understand the term.

 

 

But what does that mean? That Vladimir Putin is growing more authoritarian?

 

I think this is Mr Putin’s attempt to secure a third term, cosmetically nominating Dmitry Medvedev as his successor but, in substance, securing a third term in office.

 

 

But what does that say about Russia today?

 

Russia is no longer a communist state. But it’s not a democratic state either. Russia is under authoritarian rule and the nationalistic vein here is very strong.

 

 

Some time ago, you drew a comparison between what is going on in Russia now and what was going on there in the 1930s. You said the regime was “worthy of the 1930s.” Could you expand?

 

Authoritarian rule is not a new development in Russia. It is a tradition. The regime in the 1930s – when one man controlled every major institution in the country – is the most extreme example of that. He passed the laws, controlled the media, provided for security and made every major economic decision. So it was one man and one rule. We have seen an attempt to create a very similar system over the past eight years. But it’s different: it’s a 21^st-century variant. It’s not the same. But the substance, the main idea – that one person makes all the key decisions – is very, very similar.

 

 

Comparing Russia in the 1930s and Russia today – and you started out in politics under the Soviet Union – is tantamount to comparing Stalin and Putin… Are you saying Putin a 21^st-century Stalin?

 

No. I would say that’s a very big exaggeration. What I am saying is that a political system in which one individual dominates every aspect of public life, every aspect of politics, and every aspect of economic policy and economic development, bears a resemblance to the 1930s. But it is not fair to stretch that all the way to saying that the two individuals in question resemble each other. They are really different.

 

 

Obviously, because, there are elections (and the regime says that they are free and democratic). But you clearly disagree. Which begs the question why no other candidates can even hope to win these elections. Do you think these elections are really democratic?

 

No. In my view, Russia has no elections. The Constitution calls the procedure currently underway an election campaign, and speaks of elections and votes. It is not the same as the system we had back in the early 1990s. Nor is it the same as in countries that have open and fair elections. The procedure in Russia today is completely different. It is different because the candidates don’t all get the same chance, and because different political forces don’t all get the same chance to take part. That happens in a system that has no independent media whatsoever (electronic or otherwise). There is no independent justice in this system. And independent political-party financing is impossible in principle. Financing that could end up funding political movements would be swiftly – and fiercely – quashed by the authorities. So, if you have no independent media, no independent justice and no independent political-party financing, it is simply impossible to build credible political opposition or to have opposition candidates to be reckoned with. It’s just not possibly in such a system. That is why we have a special procedure that involves transferring power from one hand to another in Russia today.

 

 

So what is it? You say it isn’t an election. Is it an illusion? A masquerade? A fake election? What would you call it?

 

I would say that democracy, in Russia, is a kind of a Potemkin village, a kind of façade. Part of this façade involves a special procedure we call “elections”, whereby a new president is publicly nominated for the top job at the Kremlin. It’s a public referendum of sorts.

 

 

I would now like to look back on your political year. As I said, you started out in politics under the Soviet Union and worked very hard under Gorbachev and during the Perestroika. Jennifer Knock, a France 24 journalist, prepared this portrait.

 

A junior boxing champion, Grigory Yavlinski is a heavyweight of economic liberalism in Russia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, he developed market reforms that became the 500-days plan (measures adopted by President Boris Yeltsin to take Russia towards a market economy). Yavlinski founded his own political party, Yabloko, Russian for “the apple”.

 

“This policy will be the open policy, democratic policy, the policy that will be rooted in the economy and in private property, and, from a political standpoint, rooted in human rights. Russia is absolutely prepared for that.”

 

In 1996, Yavlinski ran as a presidential candidate but his campaign – in which he called for an end to Russian hostilities in Chechnya – was a failure: Yavlinski managed only fourth place. The year 2000 brought a turning point. Vladimir Putin took control of the Kremlin and Putin’s opponents found that they had little space on Russia’s political stage. In the 2003 General Elections, Yabloko failed to achieve the threshold required to enter Parliament.

 

“I’m not fighting personalities from the Kremlin or personalities from the other parties. I am fighting the history of Russia, a monarchic tradition dating back thousands of years.”

 

And Russia’s monarchs are more powerful than ever. Yavlinski denounced the imprisonment of billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a former funder of the Yabloko party. He has also protested against the proposed Gazprom headquarters in historic Saint Petersburg and against the conduct of last year’s general elections. But, in today’s Russia, where small parties are stifled, Yavlinski has a battle simply to make his voice heard.

 

 

So, Mr Yavlinski, do you see not winning the presidential election as a personal failure? How do you feel about that?

 

Personally, I don’t see it as a failure: I see it as a much longer road to victory – to the victory of a new life in Russia – than I had predicted in the early 1990s. The road will be much longer.

 

 

We also saw you were a boxing champion. Do you still have enough energy to fight against  what you see as a new Soviet-like colossus in Moscow?

 

This is the vital interest of my country. Creating a system genuinely rooted in human rights and freedom in the 21^st century is vital. Which goes to say that there is no choice. There is no other choice than to stand against the authoritarian and totalitarian approach to politics in Russia today. And my colleagues and I – and dozens of thousands of Russians – are and will continue working to achieve that. It’s not a personal issue. It’s much bigger. If I didn’t, others would pick up the torch.

 

 

Precisely, people are wondering why you decided not to run, and why you are seem to be staying at the sidelines of politics at this point. Ludmila Saratova, for instance, e-mailed us this question from Moscow: Why have you completely disappeared from political live? We hear Gary Kasparov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov but not Grigory Yavlinski. What can you tell this France 24 viewer?

 

The main part of the answer is that my view on the current situation is so clear-cut and so critical of the current leadership that I really have very little space to express it and to speak to my voters. We have a very clear strategy. One of our goals is to avoid creating the same system we had in the middle of the 1990s, which would pave the way for a new Putin-like regime in Russia. In that area, we have serious differences with a few of our colleagues.

 

 

What do you think about what Gary Kasparov is doing these days? Are you backing him?

 

I think he is one of the world’s best chess players.

 

 

Meaning he is not exactly one of Russia’s best politicians…

 

That’s about it.

 

 

Which opposition candidate, in your view, could actually muster enough support to counterbalance Vladimir Putin or Dmitri Medvedev?

 

First of all, I want to repeat the most important thing: I want your viewers, and Europeans in general, to understand that in a country where there is no independent electronic media, no independent justice – hence no law – and no independent political-party financing, you can’t create opposition in the sense that Europeans understand the term.

 

 

But you don’t think anyone could rally the opposition?

 

The opposition encompasses people who criticise Putin because they feel he is not nationalistic enough. We have a National Bolshevik Party which is, so to speak, the close ally of Mr Kasparov’s. But the National Bolsheviks are fighting Putin from the other side of the spectrum to the liberal democrats. We have a Communist party that also opposes Mr Putin. We have criminal gangs trying to create political opposition to the Kremlin. And we have democratic opposition. I represent democratic opposition and I wouldn’t agree that you can put Communists, Bolsheviks, Fascists and Nationalists in the same bag as the Democrats. My party is not prepared to create political forces like that. Because those forces have no political future in the eyes of people fighting for liberal democracy and who want to see Russia as a European country twenty year from now.

 

 

Very well, Mr Yavlinski. Very well. This is the end of the first part of our interview. We will be right back after the France 24 news. Stay with us.

 

 

Welcome back to The Talk de Paris with Grigory Yavlinski live from Moscow. Grigory Yavlinski one of the main leaders of the opposition to Vladimir Putin and president of Yabloko, the Russian United Democratic Party. I would also like to welcome Gauthier Rybinski, our international-affairs specialist here at France 24. Grigory Yavlinski, I have a question about this presidential election and its apparently foregone conclusion: rumour has it that, if Dmitri Medvedev is voted in, Vladimir Putin will be his Prime Minister. How do you think they will share the helm? Is a two-headed eagle in the Kremlin a realistic possibility?

 

First of all, I want to say that I’m not sure that Vladimir Putin will become Prime Minister. Secondly, I think that Mr Putin will be the main political figure. For how long, and how far this two-headed eagle can fly – especially as the heads are facing in opposite directions – I do not know. This is the big question in Russian politics. Russia has no experience of two people running the State and the country together. In my opinion, it would be something like a third Vladimir Putin term. He would be in charge.

 

 

But how long do you think the cohabitation can last?

 

That’s difficult to say. It’s very difficult to say. We don’t have any experience to go by. And it’s very difficult to say how long two people will be able to communicate efficiently and understand each other well enough to hold the helm together in Russia. But I think Mr Medvedev is prepared. Mr Medvedev is prepared. But, in actual fact, he will be following President Putin’s political agenda.

 

 

Is there a historical precedent? Will Mr Putin be Medvedev’s Rasputin?

 

No, I don’t think that analogy fits. I think Mr Putin is preparing to hold on to power. And not only for Mr Medvedev’s term in office. I think he is planning to hold on to power until 2020. His speech was about exactly that. He is making plans and forecasts for twelve years to come. So it’s not outrageous to conjecture that he is planning to stay in power for a long period of time. But what will actually happen is very difficult to say.

 

 

Very will. I would now like to get back to your party, Yabloko. Romain Goguelin, our correspondent in Moscow, asked passers-by what they know about you and your party. Here’s what they told us for The Talk de Paris.

 

“Today it’s just a party.”

 

“It’s time has come and gone.”

 

“They have a great vision, but they’re having trouble putting it to work. Because they’re too self-centred.”

 

“They’ve long been forgotten.”

 

“They don’t exist any more. They’ve obviously left the political scene.”

 

“I like him. He’s a good economist. He’s the kind of man you want to trust.”

 

“The Yabloko party? It’s Yavlinski. That’s what’s left of democracy.”

 

“Do you believe the opposition should have more candidates for the presidential elections?”

“People should have a choice. Today there’s no choice.”

 

“Does the opposition have a candidate for the election?”

“No, there is no valid candidate. We only have the old guy. But I can hardly call him the opposition.”

 

 

What do you have to say about this improvised poll in the streets of Moscow?

 

I’m very happy that the people know the Yabloko Party. That’s a big advantage in a country where you have no independent media and almost no access to the big newspapers, to television or to radio today. So the fact that the people still remember the Russian United Democratic Party is a good sign for the future.

 

 

Let’s take that further. Gauthier Rybinski, a specialist in international affairs and Russia here with us today has a question.

 

Gauthier Rybinski – I wanted to pick up where Ulysse Gosset left off a moment ago: you were a real political alternative back in the 1990s but, as you said, efforts to muzzle political parties and the press since stopped you getting any further. My question is what has happened to the Russian people? What has killed their interest in politics to the point that all you have to do is name an iron-fisted candidate and they all just applaud? I know my question is verging on social psychology…

 

It’s not so much about psychology. It’s about the political atmosphere in the country. Russia had no public politics at all for 80 years, from 1917 to the end of the 1980s, and from 1996 (Yeltsin’s second election) to date, aside of a brief interlude in between. Yeltsin’s second term and Putin brought special political techniques to depoliticise the Russian public. To convince the people that they haven’t got a chance to change the situation, that they can’t change anything in Russia, and that their vote is not in the least bit important. They have done that with very powerful and very massive propaganda, and by curtailing civil society and political parties. And they have achieved very clear results. The people have lost their confidence in politics. They have lost their self-confidence. They have even lost the notion that they could change something in their own country. Combine that with high oil, gas and raw-material prices, and with the fact that Russian people are considerably better off now than they were five years ago as a result, and you won’t have much trouble understanding why they are depoliticised and don’t believe…

 

 

Precisely, you mentioned oil prices and the Russian economy’s newfound health. Don’t you think Mr Putin’s popularity – which is high: a few polls have actually put his approval rates at over 80% – has something to do with the fact that he has restored Russia’s pride, put an end to the humiliation it endured, and gave it back some of its grandeur?

 

[Retake]

Mr Yavlinski, how do you explain Vladimir Putin’s popularity – which is high: depending on the poll, 60 to 80% of the people are happy with him? Can’t we credit him with putting an end to Russia’s humiliation?

 

First of all, it’s difficult to say exactly how popular Mr Putin’s actually is because there are no independent polling agencies in Russia. Secondly, I think the people see Mr Putin as the man who  can keep further humiliation, crises, terrorism and the like at bay in Russia. It is true that the public opinion sees him as a man who can protect the country.

 

 

Mikhail Gorbachev on this show credited Vladimir Putin with establishing law and order, and stability, in Russia. He also credited him with putting Russia back on the international scene – obviously at least in part thanks to increasing oil and gas pries. Do you agree?

 

First of all, I don’t think Putin has established law and order in Russia. I feel, and I know, that the level of corruption and the level of disorder in Russia are very, very high. Secondly, I want to say that I have very big doubts whether it is possible to establish civil order in a country where you have no independent justice or independent law. It is true that Putin’s support for the United States in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, his stance on the war in Iraq, his decision to cooperate with NATO in Afghanistan and other such moves have put Russia on the international playing field. And people are certainly pleased about that.

 

 

We have a question from a Russia specialist, Pierre Lorrain.

 

Good day, Mr Yavlinski. When we look at Russian politics from a long-term perspective, we can only be appalled by the fact that the truly democratic parties – the truly liberal social democratic parties – have been unable to unite and form a force to be reckoned with in today’s political arena. During the 1990s, I thought you had a chance. Don’t you feel responsible for this wasted opportunity, that you didn’t’ get together with other politicians like yourself and unite at a moment when it was possible – and even necessary?

 

 

What can you or Russia’s political parties answer to that?

 

I am very happy that I have so many friends in Europe taking such a keen interest in developments in Russia. But I would also like to say that the number of politicians who are genuinely devoted to democracy in Russia – and who also kept a clear corruption record in the 1990s – is very, very small. I would be delighted if there were millions of Russian politicians fighting for a liberal democratic future, and for a social democratic future, and if the only problem was getting them all to do so together. But the situation is different. The number of politicians who kept clear from oligarchic corruption in the mid-1990s, and are still doing their best to build democracy in Russia, is very, very small. The number of people who opposed Mr Yeltsin’s policies in the 1990s, and who opposed corruption, who opposed the war in the Northern Caucasus and the war in Chechnya, is very low. And that is not just a matter of principle. The problem is much deeper. The problem is that all those developments back in the mid-1990s killed the majority’s faith in democracy. We can go through the mid-1990s year by year and see exactly what made the disappointment grow so huge. So there are very few supporters of democracy in Russia. On the other hand, there is a very strong nationalistic movement in Russia, there is a fascist movement in Russia, there is a communist movement in Russia, and I disagree with people who say that they should all unite to fight Putin’s system and Putin’s regime. That is a matter of principle.

 

Precisely. The crisis in Kosovo is obviously ruffling feathers in Russia’s nationalist circles – and causing uproar across Europe. Gauthier Rybinski has a question.

 

Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February and all stir it caused really actually conceal two opposing principles: people’s right to self-determination (and that of Kosovo’s Albanese-speaking people in particular) and international law (which backs Russia’s and Serbia’s claim over Kosovo). What is your position?

 

My personal position – and, maybe, my party’s position – is that Europe missed a chance to solve this problem.

 

 

Meaning it missed a chance when former Yugoslavia started falling apart or missed a chance more recently?

 

Let me explain my view on that. NATO’s decision to bomb Belgrade in 1999 was the first mistake. Europe’s failure to do everything it could to simultaneously integrate Kosovo and Serbia into the European Union by a long step-by-step process, leading to what happened a few days ago, was the second mistake. And I think it can cause serious problems in the very near future. I also think convincing Yeltsin to “fire” (so to speak) Milosevic was an option back in 1999, and would have made more sense than bombing Belgrade.

 

 

Meaning Russia was wrong to recognise Kosovo’s independence…

 

First of all, I would like to say that not all European countries recognised its independence. But that’s a mere formality at this point. I think Europe was wrong not to explore all the options. I mean all the diplomatic, practical and economic options to simultaneously integrate Serbia and Kosovo into the European Union – even if it had taken five years, seven years, or however long. It would have been much better than what happened two days ago.

 

 

One last question: do you think you could be arrested, and end up somewhere in Siberia or something, if the current regime’s authoritarian streak gets any stronger? Or is that simply impossible?

 

I don’t think that could happen right after this programme.

 

 

So, at the end of the day, there is still some form of democracy and freedom of speech in Russia. After all, you are talking to us live from Moscow.

 

That’s what I wanted to say when you asked me about the political climate today vis-à-vis the political climate under the Soviet regime in the 1930s. Today I can speak on your programme live from Moscow, and explain my political views and those of my party, even though they differ radically from those of Vladimir Putin. The problem is that I can’t tell the Russian public about them. But we will fight for democracy and I believe we will get there sooner or later.

 

 

Thank you very much, Grigory Yavlinski, President of Yabloko, the Russian United Democratic Party. We will obviously be following Russia’s presidential election here on France 24 – in English, French and Arabic. I would like to thank the team that helped us prepare this edition and – in particular – Olivier Rousseau, who designed this new set for The Talk de Paris. I would also like to thank Gauthier Rybinski, Julia Dorner and Renaud Lefort. We will be back next week with another Talk of Paris. See you then.