French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared on Monday that he had finalised business deals worth over 10 billion euros with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi during their meeting in Paris.
However, the French premier declined the opportunity to divulge any specifics regarding the proposed contracts.
Seif il Islam, Gaddafi's potential successor, went on record on 7 December saying that Libya wanted to buy a number of Airbus planes, some nuclear reactors and a variety of military equipment in a deal worth over three million euros, in an interview with French newspaper Le Figaro.
This brought up the subject of the Rafale, the 50-million-euro French jet fighter and pride of the air force, that is yet to be exported despite 13 years of military service.
According to Philippe Vasset, editor of an economic publication called Intelligence Online, such sales have always been difficult to nail down as “such a sale implies both political and commercial negotiations”. Mere ‘sophistication’ of the product is not enough.
The Rafale is manufactured by Dassault Aviation, one of the mainstays of the French defense industry, and is an aircraft from the previous generation. It was conceived as an ‘Omni Role’ jet fighter, able to operate both from land bases and aircraft carriers. It also has the added ability to carry out a number of roles, simultaneously, even on the same mission: being able to combine air superiority, defense, target recognition and surface attack capabilities in the same package.
Despite this flexibility, the Rafale still only operates in France, a source of embarrassment for Dassault which has exported 75% of its planes since 1975.
The menace of world-wide competition
Despite its status as the fourth biggest arms exporter in the world, France faces intense competition for contracts. As recently as 2005 Russia sneaked ahead of it to sell 70 assorted military aircraft to Algeria. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was also able to pull off something of a coup by persuading Saudi Arabia to take 72 Eurofighters off their hands.
However, the greatest competition predictably comes from the United States. In 2002 France were beaten to the punch on three occasions, with South Korea, the Netherlands and Australia all choosing the American F16. In 2005 Singapore plumped for Boeing’s F15 rather than the Rafale.
If these were “usual customers” of the Americans, the same can not be said of Morocco, a traditional French ally. In June 2007 the north Africans also chose the F16, rather than the Rafale, a painful slap in the face for Paris.
That particular failure lies not with the plane, or with the relative weakness of the American dollar, but with a succession of spats between the two countries, according to Jean Guisnel, a journalist with ‘Le Point’ magazine.
While Paris was trying to extricate itself from a misfiring economy, and the diplomatic and political wrangles that surrounded the sale of the Rafale, the United States took advantage of the gulf between France and Morocco, “complemented by the very favourable economic conditions”, said Guisnel.
Two billion euros could buy just 18 Rafales, compared to 24 F16s for 1.6 billion. When this deal was also backed up by political support, the calculations were quick and easy.
Following the fiasco over this potential deal, Nicolas Sarkozy decided to create a work-group to look over military contracts tendered abroad. This includes representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, the president’s chief of staff and the Prime Minister’s office, which has just recently started its work.
This is certainly a necessary step, but is it sufficient in today’s arms market?